Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Abundant evidence affirms that religious belief affects a wide range of behavioral outcomes (Iannaccone 1998) , and religious activity can affect economic performance at the level of the individual, group, or nation through at least two channels. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that participation in religious sects could potentially convey two economic advantages to adherents (Anderson 1988) . 1 The first could be as a reputational signal: while the poor might look alike to potential employers, lenders, and customers, membership in a "good" sect could convey a reduction in risk associated with the particular individual and ultimately improve the efficient allocation of resources. 2 Second, sects could also provide for extra-legal means of establishing trust and sanctioning miscreants in intragroup transactions, again reducing uncertainty and improving efficiency, especially where civil remedies for failure to uphold contracts were weak.
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This interpretation is essentially contentless with respect to the actual nature of religious belief.
Indeed, there is nothing necessarily unique about religious sects in this regard--the argument could apply to a wide range of voluntary associations or clubs.
A variant of this notion offered by modernization theorists such as Hoselitz (1960) , McClelland (1961) , and Hagen (1962) is that traditional societies resist change, and innovative groups can be important in the process of modernization. Hoselitz, in particular, argued that socially marginalized groups might seize on economic enrichment as a mechanism for securing prosperity and security. Religious affiliation could serve as the base for group cohesion necessary to successfully challenge established institutions and practices. For example, according to Lal (1998) , Buddhism and Jainism played just this sort of role in ancient India.
1 Following Iannaccone (1998) , the term religion is used to mean any shared set of beliefs, activities, and institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces. Max Weber (1906 Weber ( /2002 further distinguishes between churches, for instance Catholic or Lutheran, which are inclusive, voluntary organizations, characterized by formal hierarchical administration, that minister to all-damned and saved alike-who happen to fall under their administration, typically due to birth, and where possible seek to have their authority reinforced by association with the state. In contrast, sects-and here he includes American Baptists, Quakers, Presbyterians, and other groups descending from Puritanism-are defined as exclusive, voluntary communities of the religiously qualified, governed by a network of peers, whose principal political demand is freedom from the state. 2 In 'Churches ' and 'Sects' in North America (1906/2002) , Weber provides particularly vivid first-hand accounts of both of these effects in operation in turn-of-the-century America. In other settings, Weber ( /1952 Weber ( /1958 , Lewis (1955) , McClelland (1961) , Hagen (1962) , and Bellah (1963) make reference to Jews, Huguenots, Quakers, Jains, and Parsees among others. Kennedy (1988) and Platteau (1994) provide numerous contemporary examples from sub-Saharan Africa. Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) argue that networks increase returns to educational investments, and this networking effect could further reinforce the economic impact of sect membership. 3 Fafchamps (2002) provides a dissenting view, arguing that there is no empirical evidence to support the collective sanction hypothesis.
sources of intellectual ferment, misunderstanding the economic antecedents of industrial capitalism, thoroughly confusing the historical record with respect to the rise of capitalism in Catholic and Protestant communities in Western Europe, and even mishandling the statistical data he had at his disposal. 7 It is fair to say that today no one (with the possible exception of Landes [1998] ) accepts Weber's thesis at face value. Blum and Dudley (2001) provide the most sophisticated version of the Weber thesis, arguing that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (in contradistinction to the Catholic practice of ritual penance), in game-theoretic terms, increased the cost of contractual defection (i.e., breaking contracts was a bigger deal for Protestants). This
Protestant reluctance to break contracts contributed to greater trust and willingness to honor contracts with strangers and thereby contributed to the spread of more extensive information networks in the Protestant lands of Northern Europe, and it was these network externalities that promoted growth and the rise of industrial capitalism.
These two lines of reasoning-religion as a club and as a molder of behavior-merge in a fascinating paper by Greif (1994) who analyzes the 11th century competition between Maghribi traders (North African Jewish traders who had adopted the values of Muslim society) and the Genoese merchants.
Greif demonstrates that the Maghribi displayed the reputational and intragroup cohesion associated with religious sects. The Genoese cultural innovations included formal contracts, courts to provide for their enforcement, the family firm (as distinct from an individual trader), and ultimately the joint stock company and associated accounting innovations. These organizational innovations were more efficient than the Maghribi methods, and as technological and political changes expanded the geographic scope of markets beyond the Mediterranean, the Genoese captured these new opportunities. Eventually the Maghribi disappeared as a distinct community, being absorbed into the existing Egyptian Jewish community.
Greif asserts that the contrast between the cultural innovation of the Genoese on the one hand and the unwillingness or inability of the Maghribi to adapt on the other stemmed from cultural differences between the Genoese individualist society of the Latinate and the Maghribi communalist or collectivist society of the Muslim world. 8 He then goes on to associate the 7 See Tawney (1926 Tawney ( /1964 , Samuelsson (1961) , Eisenstadt (1968) , Giddens (1976) , Furnham (1990) , Kaufmann (1997) , and Iannaccone (1998) . The argument by Greif (1994) outlined below and supporting evidence from Kaufmann (1997) suggest that fundamental economic and social innovations were occurring in Europe centuries before the Reformation. Lal (1998) reaches the same conclusion through a different route, emphasizing changes in family law under Pope Gregory I and the establishment of modern legal institutions under Pope Gregory VII. 8 Greif (1994) and others use the term "collectivist" to describe societies characterized by a social order in which individuals typically interact socially and economically with other members of a common affinity individualistic Genoese with today's successful developed countries and the communalist Maghribi with today's less successful developing countries. 9 This argument just pushes the question back one step further: From where did these differing belief systems originate?
Until recently, economists have paid little attention to this issue; future Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis, one of the few who did, expressed skepticism that religious beliefs had any significant impact on economic behavior and indeed argued that the causality probably ran the other direction: Despite religion's claim to be the ultimate primal, changes in economic circumstances spurred theological adaptation (Lewis 1955) . In this regard, Lewis, in asserting the primacy of economics over religion, followed the common practice of elevating one's own scholastic specialty to the primal; Hofstede, a sociologist, wrote "Religious affiliation by itself is less culturally relevant than is often assumed if we trace the religious histories of countries, then the religion a population has embraced along with the version of that religion seem to have been a result of previously existing cultural value patterns as much as a cause of cultural differences" (Hofstede 1997, 16 ; emphasis in the original). This conundrum-how to sort out the pattern of causality among economics, culture, and religious belief-is a central challenge.
This paper is an attempt to empirically analyze the second line of argumentation, recognizing per Greif that intermediating institutions may be the mechanism through which religious belief affects economic performance at the aggregate level. The paper first reviews the line of reasoning initiated by Weber that the specific content of religious beliefs may profoundly affect economic behavior. It then examines efforts undertaken primarily by psychologists and sociologists to quantitatively score national cultural tendencies. In the fourth section, data on religious affiliation, national culture, and economic performance are analyzed at the crossnational level. Since considerable recent commentary has focused on the alleged impact of Islam, specifically on economic performance, this issue is addressed in the fifth section, both crossgroup, with social and economic interactions governed by ascriptive norms subject to enforcement through intragroup sanctions; relations with members of out-groups are circumscribed and noncooperative. Group cohesion is highly valued. As Kuran (1997) observes, these social relations might better be described as "communalist" with the term "collectivist" reserved for moralities that assign an important role to the state. The social structure of "individualist" societies is characterized by extensive interaction among members of different groups, with individuals identifying with, and switching among, multiple groups. Economic interaction is governed by formal contracts enforceable through specialized organizations. Self-reliance is highly valued. See also Triandis (1995) and Hofstede (1997 Hofstede ( , 2001 . 9 Kennedy's description of the practices of Hausa merchants in West Africa is remarkably similar to Greif's depiction of the Maghribi. Likewise, after documenting their remarkable intermediation of trade throughout West Africa, Kennedy observes "of course, it is possible that these very systems of customary support which have underpinned contractual relations so successfully may increasingly inhibit the emergence of more advanced types of business behavior in the future" (Kennedy 1988, 146) . nationally and at the subnational level, using data from three multi-religious, multi-ethnic countries-India, Malaysia, and Ghana-located in three different areas of the world.
To preview the conclusions elaborated in the final section of the paper, the sociological and psychological analyses of the impact of religion on economic performance are indeterminate.
Empirically, variables used to quantify national cultures are correlated with measures of religious affiliation and/or intensity of belief (i.e., they measure something), though they have no predictive power with respect to national economic performance.
In contrast, in regressions on economic performance, the hypothesis that the coefficients on variables of religious affiliation are jointly equal to zero can frequently be rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance (i.e., religion matters), but like Barro and McCleary (2002) (Weber /1952 ).
Confucianism, in Weber's view, was "this-worldly," but its promotion of harmonious relations along prescribed patterns was antithetical to the "creative destruction" of capitalism, to use Schumpeter's later-used phrase, and its codification of ethical rather than formal legal procedure inhibited the development of capitalist commercial relations. 10 In Weber's words, "Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world" (Weber /1964 . While a Puritan could live "'in' the world and not be part 'of' it," the Confucian ideal was to live "in" the world as a well-adjusted part of it (Weber /1964 . 11 Of course, Confucius made a great comeback in the "Asian values" debate, albeit with a long lag (cf. Kahn 1979) . 12 Weber argued that while Hinduism and Buddhism promoted asceticism, it was an "otherworldly" or "world-rejecting" asceticism that upheld escape from, not mastery over, the material world. 13 The emphasis on ritual law in Hinduism acted as an impediment to technical or social innovation from within and even hampered local adaptations of foreign innovations, and Weber 10 Some contemporary research into the impact of legal traditions on financial development and growth could be interpreted as providing support to Weber's contention (Mahoney 2001; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2002) . 11 Weber argued that Taoism, the leading heterodoxy in China, could not play an "oppositionist" role to the dominant Confucian orthodoxy, analogous to radical Protestantism, because its "other-worldly" mysticism, toleration of magic, and encouragement of inaction, made it uniquely unsuited to spur the kind of rationalist revolution that occurred in Europe. Weber ascribes the failure of China to develop rational institutions beyond the "fetters of the kinship group" to the absence of a universalist ethical religion such as the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Weber /1964 . 12 Hofstede and Bond (1988) scored cross-national survey data for a "Confucian dynamism" or long-term orientation scale. The variable is statistically significantly correlated with growth during the period 1965-85. Lal (1998) ascribes this to Sinic family structures. This will be taken up further in the next section. 13 As in the case of the other religions, the discussion presumes that there is enough of an essential belief system in Hinduism to usefully discuss Hindu values shaping social behavior. Morris (1967) persuasively argues that there is not, particularly in past history, when the precolonial subcontinent was characterized by a high degree of political and economic fragmentation.
went so far as to argue that Hinduism's assimilative powers were so great that they negatively impacted even non-Hindu regions of South Asia (Weber /1958 Islam) is that it has maintained its "identity without being tied to a given political framework"-presumably an asset in the process of modernization (Eisenstadt 1968, 32) .
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In Weber's writings that touched on Islam, he argues that the characteristic "prebendal feudalism," and "arbitrary bureaucratic patrimonialism" of the Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman dynasties, impeded the development of rational, predictable, and evolving legal structures without which rational capitalism could not emerge (Turner 1974 (Turner , 1996 Crone 1999; Schluchter 1999 Yet at the level of the individual psyche, Weber also subscribed to the notion that a warrior-ethic that emphasized pillage as a means of acquisition was incompatible with the "spirit of capitalism," though numerous commentators have observed that Weber was misguided in purely factual terms (cf. Turner 1974 , Kuran 1997 , Lapidus 1999 , Levtzion 1999 . Neither did
Islam encourage counter-striving behavior in areas where Muslims were a minority (such as South Asia) nor did dissenting movements within Islam play a similar role to Calvinism in encouraging rational mastery of the world. 16 Yet, as Gellner argued, "by various obvious criteria-universalism, scripturalism, spiritual egalitarianism, the extension of full participation of the sacred community not to one, or some, but to all, and the rationalization of social life-Islam 14 However, he compared the economically successful Jains and Parsees to European Jewry in terms of social exclusion and argued that certain Jainist tenets strongly paralleled Quaker and Puritan views (Weber /1952 (Weber , 1958 . 15 Eisenstadt (1968, 34) argues that the subsequent failure of India to develop successfully reflects "the failure of Hinduism to develop motivational orientations and commitments to the undertaking and performance of new secular roles…It was easier, paradoxically enough, for minority Hindu groups-mainly abroad-to form such a linkage than it was within India herself." 16 On the first point, see Weber ( /1958 , Lewis (1955), and Metcalf (1999) . On the latter point, see Cook (1999) , Metcalf (1999), and Peters (1999) . Rodinson (1973) argues that there were precisely such dynamic minority sects within Islam, and that the writings of Muslim ethicists during the Middle Ages (i.e., prior to the rise of capitalism in Europe) reveal a greater affinity toward economic advance than did those of their Christian counterparts. Geertz (1956 Geertz ( , 1968 and Hagen (1962) describe the role of economically modernizing Muslim sects in modern Indonesia.
is, of the three great Western monotheisms, the one closest to modernity" (Gellner, 1981, 7;  emphasis in the original). 19 What they were trying to measure was "the desire to do something better, faster, more efficiently, with less effort…It is a very specific, rather rare, drive which focuses on the goal of efficiency and which expresses itself in activities available in the culture which permit or encourage one to be more efficient; and across cultures the most common form such activity 17 Weber did not use the term "modernization," which is of relatively recent vintage, and subsequent research by the modernization theorists was arguably more influenced by the thinking of his contemporary Emile Durkheim, and later, Talcott Parsons. See Adelman and Morris (1971) for a good survey of this literature; also Hoselitz (1960) and Hagen (1962) . 18 "A whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled "secularization theory" is essentially mistaken…[the] idea is simple: Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals. And it is precisely this key idea that has turned out to be wrong" (Berger 1999, 2-3) . Berger (1999, 2) graciously adds, "As I like to tell my students, one advantage of being a social scientist, as against being, say, a philosopher or a theologian, is that you can have as much fun when your theories are falsified as when they are verified!" Gellner (1992) argues that the secularization thesis is essentially correct with respect to the world's major religious traditions-with the sole exception of Islam. 19 See Furnham (1990) for a survey of other attempts to psychometric assessments of Protestant work ethic beliefs.
takes is business" (McClelland 1976, A-B) , similar to the notion of X-efficiency (Leibenstein 1966 obtained from the children's readers and subsequent changes in the production of electricity, which he took as a proxy for economic growth, though Hofstede (1997 Hofstede ( , 2001 ) observes that the relationship between need for achievement and per capita income growth did not hold for a later sample period.
More generally, McClelland found that among both the preliterate societies and contemporary groups, high need-for-achievement scores were associated with religious practices that stressed individual (as distinct from ritualistic) contact with the Divine and a de-emphasis on 20 According to Hofstede, "In choosing the achievement motive, the American McClelland has promoted a typical Anglo value complex to a universal recipe for economic success. A Frenchman, Swede, or Japanese would have been unlikely to conceive of a worldwide achievement motive. Even the word 'achievement' is difficult to translate into other languages (Hofstede 1997, 124 ; emphasis in the original). 21 Among the more curious applications was done by Bradburn and Burlew (1961) , who used various types of literature to measure changes in achievement orientation over time in Tudor, England. Per Greif, McClelland also notes, in passing, that literature analysis suggests that the Genoese had a high achievement orientation. Intriguingly, Kennedy (1988) cites a study of Nigerian schoolchildren by LeVine (1966) in which the Hausa, which in certain respects are reminiscent of the Maghribi, ranked lowest on need to achieve among the three largest ethnic groups. 22 See McClelland (1961) for details of the methods used in making these measurements. 23 Rosen (1959) found that North American Jews were distinct in that they were the only group for which need-for-achievement scores did not decline with social class.
religious experts or authorities as a necessary adjunct to the performance of religious duties. He also reports sociological survey evidence that appears to confirm the casual empiricism of Weber and Lewis regarding Quakers and Jains: adherents to some of these religions (e.g., Quakers in the United States; Jains, Vaishnava Hindus, and Parsees in India; Zen Buddhists in Japan) are overrepresented among the business elite. He had remarkably little to say about Islam.
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Cross-national surveys of individual respondents' cultural predilections were undertaken on a much grander scale as part of an IBM management program over the 1967-73 period (Hofstede 1997 (Hofstede , 2001 . Two rounds of survey questionnaires were administered to 88,000 IBM employees in 1967 and 1973. In addition to the demographic control questions, the surveys consisted of 60 "core" questions and 66 "recommended" questions; the surveys were conducted in 20 languages on IBM employees in 72 countries. Of these, 65 countries had enough respondents to warrant analysis at the national level. Subsequently, Hofstede constructed estimates for an additional 16 countries. These survey results have served as the springboard for a large-and controversial-social psychology literature.
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According to Hofstede, statistical analysis of the responses suggested that they could be characterized along four dimensions: a power-distance index ("the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is unequally distributed"); an uncertainty-avoidance index ("the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations"); an individualismcollectivism dimension ("individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose…collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups…"); and a masculine-feminine dimension ("masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct…femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life"). Hofstede argued that McClelland's need for achievement was strongly correlated with the combination of weak uncertainty avoidance and strong masculinity.
As a check on the possible cultural bias of the survey, a second survey was designed by
Chinese social scientists and administered to groups of 100 students (half male, half female) in 23 24 While McClelland had little to say about Islam, he did make another intriguing observation. Communism could be regarded as a ecclesiastical and formalistic religion, which would tend toward a collectivist mentality in social relations. However, the need-to-achieve score calculated from USSR children's readers in 1950 was very high, leading McClelland to predict a rise in individualistic attitudes in the USSR. At the same time, the Soviets were consciously disrupting traditional family life by encouraging female labor force participation, with the likely effect of further eroding traditional values. McClelland speculated that similar forces might be at work in China, though he had no data on need-to-achieve scores in the Chinese case. 25 See Furnham (1990) for a judicious review.
countries. The results of the Chinese-designed survey were mapped to the four dimensions reported above, except that there was no counterpart to the uncertainty-avoidance index, and instead another response pattern cluster emerged that was labeled the long-term/short-term dimension-"the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift; its opposite pole stands for the fostering of virtues related to past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of 'face' and fulfilling social obligations" (Hofstede 2001, 359 ).
Hofstede argued that culture precedes religion: religions that fit, not change, pre-existing values are adopted. Of the four cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance appears to be most meaningfully related to religion. The basic religio-cultural schism is between the revealed-truth monotheistic religions (Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam) of high uncertaintyavoidance cultures and religions of the low uncertainty-avoidance cultures, including Hinduism and Buddhism, which tend to emphasize ritual and virtue over indisputable truth. Two exceptions stand out: Japan, which scores extremely high on uncertainty avoidance, and the Protestantdominated societies that, exceptionally for people of the book, score low on uncertainty avoidance. Individualistic societies tend to promote religions that emphasize the individual's relationship with the supernatural; the Protestant-dominated societies score the highest on this indicator (and Japan the lowest of any developed country), perhaps explaining their exceptionality with respect to uncertainty avoidance and religion.
The other two cultural dimensions also map to religious predilections. High scores on power-distance (i.e., comfort and acceptance of hierarchy) tend to be associated with Catholicism relative to Protestantism, and Hinduism relative to Islam. Countries in the Confucian cultural zone score high on power-distance, though it is unclear which came first, hierarchical social relations or Confucius.
Additional insight is provided by the final cultural indicator, the masculinity measure, in that the cultures with high femininity scores have tended to secularize faster. 26 Verweij, Ester, and Nauta (1997) , using the World Values Study data, found that Hofstede's masculinity index was statistically significantly correlated with both religiosity and orthodoxy of belief, and went some way in explaining "American exceptionalism" with respect to its coincidence of wealth, modernity, and a relatively high level of religious orientation.
What does this have to do with economic performance? Hofstede makes no claim that these cultural measures can directly explain economic performance, and indeed, they do not appear to be correlated with economic growth rates (Hofstede 2001, exhibit A6.5) . To the extent that individualism is highly correlated with per capita income, Hofstede argues that it is more likely that the causality runs from income to individualism, not the reverse.
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However, Hofstede does claim that the long-term orientation indicator causes economic performance, for example, by raising the marginal propensity to save, though he admits that like
McClelland's earlier result, this may be sample-period specific. In this respect, religions that emphasize virtue over truth, such as Hinduism, are associated with high long-term orientation scores and could be expected to promote growth. In contrast, Islam appears to be associated with very low long-term orientation that could be expected to hamper growth. 28 Nooderhaven and
Tidjani (2001) report responses derived from a subsequent sampling of African students who might be expected to embody values transmitted from pre-Abrahamic religious traditions. They make the intriguing observation that survey questions that discriminated between knowledge, wisdom, and education, tended to elicit responses in African cultures expressing a preference for wisdom and experience over knowledge, reminiscent of Appiah's (1993) distinction between traditional and modern knowledge. These responses are negatively correlated with the share of savings in GDP, the marginal propensity to save, and GDP growth at the national level.
In summary, Hofstede generated a broader set of national cultural indicators. To a significant extent they appear to support the content of the interaction of religion and personal values first elaborated by Weber. Unlike Weber, McClelland, and others, Hofstede did not claim that these are likely to influence economic outcomes (with the exception of the long-term orientation measure he claimed affected economic performance at the national level).
This work is subject to the same questions as McClelland's regarding the meaningfulness of national culture as an analytic category. More specifically, even if national cultures existed, it 27 Hofstede (2001) also predicts that demographic change in the form of aging societies will require the more efficient use of female labor and inducing declines in the masculine-feminine cultural dimension--and thus providing another example of economic change inducing cultural change. 28 Yeh and Lawrence (1995) Extending this work using the World Values Survey data, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales find that a religious upbringing has a negative impact on trust among Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus. They also find that with the exception of Buddhism, all of the major world religions encourage intolerance if that religion is the dominant one in the country. (Buddhists are also unique, according to Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, in that they are the only adherents who do not ascribe poverty to laziness.) Again, it is not hard to see some affinity to Hofstede's distinction between the high uncertainty-avoidance revealed-truth monotheistic religions (Catholicism, 29 McSweeney (2002) argues that for several reasons the responses elicited in these surveys are unlikely to be representative. Furthermore while the aggregate sample size is large, for some individual countries the sample sizes are small-less than one hundred responses. 30 On this issue of fragility, see Bond (2002) . For examples of replication, see Triandis and Bontempo (1986) and Hoppe (1998) who largely reproduces the complete set of rankings using a sample of 1,500 alumni of the Salzburg Seminar. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The hypothesis that religious attitudes affect national economic performance is a testable proposition. A standard production function in the neoclassical growth model can be written as
where Y is gross domestic product, K is the stock of human and physical capital, L is unskilled labor, A is a constant reflecting the technological starting point of each society, and µ is the exogenous rate of technological change. As written, the aggregate production function is
Cobb-Douglas with a capital (human and physical) share of α. Rewritten in intensive (i.e., per capita) form, the model implies that the growth rate of per capita income will slow over time as the marginal product on capital declines, and that in a cross-section, poorer countries (with lower capital-labor ratios) will tend to grow more quickly than rich countries, conditional on the savinginvestment rate.
For some time, economists have been troubled by the fact that the actual growth trajectories of national economies seem to contradict both implications of the model. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) , Robelo (1991) , and others launched the endogenous growth literature that sought to explain the first empirical anomaly through various mechanisms that would temper the tendency of declining marginal returns to slow the growth rate of rich economies; Barro (1991), Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) , and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) set off the now vast literature on the determinants of long-run growth across countries and subnational jurisdictions.
31 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002, 31) also claim a variety of other fascinating results: "Judaism has the strongest negative impact on willingness to cheat on taxes, Protestantism second, Catholicism and Hinduism third, and Islam fourth. The rankings are different when it comes to accepting a bribe. The strongest negative impact comes from Buddhism, with Protestants and Muslims next, and Catholics last. Stulz and Williamson (2001) make no distinction between culture and religion at all, simply using religion as a proxy for culture. They obtain the not entirely elucidated result that stock-market development depends on legal tradition (common law or civil law), while debt market and banking development depend on culture proxies (i.e., dominant religion), with creditor rights and enforcement greater in Protestantdominant societies.
In addition to the accumulation of physical and human capital, attention has focused on indicators of macroeconomic stability, trade openness, political institutions, and geography.
32 Solow (2001) questioned the role of the many right-hand-side variables that have been included in the long-run growth literature and instead argued for focusing on national differences in the level and growth of total factor productivity or TFP (i.e., Ae µt ) across countries as the lefthand-side variable to be explained. The problem, of course, is that empirical estimates of TFP are themselves derived as the residuals from growth-accounting exercises, and can be very sensitive to assumptions about the underlying aggregate production function (Pack 2001 ) and the measurement of inputs (Hsieh 2002) . Setting aside these operational issues, Solow (2001, 287) argues that nontechnological phenomena including "the security of contracts, the intensity of competition, and the respect for instrumental rationality as a mode of behavior" could have a major impact on resource allocation and hence TFP. Solow also takes issue with the implicit assumption of much of the empirical work, namely that actual measured output is at or near potential, particularly in the case of poor countries, especially monocultural primary producers.
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If these kinds of countries are included in the empirical analysis, then droughts and pests should be included in the right-hand-side variables.
In this spirit, The only significant correlation between economic performance and the noneconomic variables is a negative correlation at the 10 percent level between the population share raised religiously and per capita income growth. McClelland's need-to-achieve variable is generally uncorrelated with any other indicator-the only significant correlation between this variable and any other measure, is a negative correlation at the 10 percent level with Hofstede's long-term orientation measure. 34 The religiosity variables are highly correlated with Hofstede's indices in 32 See Levine and Renelt (1992) as a fine exemplar of this literature. Among the many commentaries, Pack (1994) , Durlauf (1996) , and Solow (2001) are particularly good. 33 Kumar and Russell (2002, table 1) suggest that typically countries may be well inside their estimated production possibility frontiers. 34 Because the sample sizes differ across the variables (ranging from 31 to 86), and the country coverage varies as well, the actual numbers of observations used to calculate these correlations varies substantially from cell to cell, and as a consequence some relatively high correlations may be less statistically significant some cases. The population share raised religiously is positively correlated with power-distance (a measure of comfort with hierarchy) and uncertainty avoidance (a measure of risk avoidance), and negatively correlated with individualism. Conversely, the share not believing in God is negatively correlated with power-distance and long-term orientation, and positively correlated with individualism. The issue is whether any relationship between religion and economic performance holds once culture and conventional measures of economic fundamentals are taken into account.
Multivariate Analysis
A standard model of economic fundamentals is reported in the first two columns of included. The basic regressions were then analyzed for simultaneity, especially with regard to the accumulation of human capital and were re-estimated using instrumental variables estimators.
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The null of equality between the coefficients derived from the OLS and 2SLS regressions could never be rejected. A summary of these nonreported regressions is available on request.
than lower correlations once differences in sample sizes are taken into account. In particular, the religiosity variables are derived from a country sample that has many states of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia that are undefined for the economic performance variables. 35 The one variable that was consistently significant was expropriation risk, but unfortunately the measure is only available for relatively recent sample periods and hence raises basic issues of causality and violating exogeneity. 36 Some Islamic governments have impeded female education. Lindert (2003) found that the presence of a "dominant Catholic Church" discouraged primary school education enrollment rates in a sample of 24 countries, 1881-1937.
In both regressions 2.1 and 2.2, initial GDP per capita, the starting point indicator, is negative and statistically significant-i.e., the countries exhibit convergence conditional on the other variables. Similarly, the coefficient on the human capital indicator, average years of schooling, is positive and statistically significant in both regressions. One surprise is that trade openness (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP) is insignificant in both regressions, presumably reflecting the crudity of this measure.
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Cultural and religiosity variables were then added one at a time to regressions 2.1 and 2.2 (i.e., six cultural variables and three religiosity variables added to two specifications for a total of 18 regressions). In no case were the cultural or religiosity variables statistically significant, and in the interest of brevity these regressions are not reported.
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Variables on religious affiliation in 1970 were then added to the standard model in regressions 2.3 and 2.4. Seven categories of religious affiliation are distinguished: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists. 39 The original source provides data at a finer level of disaggregation, but other religions tend to be either extremely small in terms of global membership (e.g., Baha'is), or are so completely concentrated in a single country that they act as a dummy for that country (e.g., Shintoism in Japan), or are themselves heterogeneous catch-all categories (e.g., ethno-religions). These religions, together with atheists and the nonreligious, collectively make up the "other religions" category. They are omitted from the regression (i.e., are absorbed in the constant) and are the standard against which the included major world religions are judged.
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The hypothesis that the coefficients on the religious variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected for both specifications, though in the case of the TFP specification (regression 2.3), none of the individual coefficients are statistically significant. In the regression on per capita growth rates (regression 2.4), the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant population shares are negatively correlated with per capita income growth, conditional on economic fundamentals.
(Differences in the underlying country samples and sample periods may have as much to do with 37 It would be desirable to develop a measure that controls for such fundamentals as domestic market size and geographic distance from foreign markets, to isolate true variations in openness to trade. See Frankel and Romer (1999) for one such effort. 38 These results differ from those obtained by Barro and McCleary (2003) who found intensity of belief (though not church attendance) positively associated with national economic performance. 39 Unfortunately, the original source does not differentiate Muslims by sect, and attempts to find consistent cross-national data in this regard have been unsuccessful. 40 Another issue is whether it is religious affiliation or the existence of a "dominant" religion (Lindert 2003) , the degree of religious fragmentation, or state-supported religion (Barro and McCleary 2003) that is relevant. The issue of state support is particularly problematic, as some countries that formally maintain a state religion appear to be fairly ecumenical in practice (e.g., Malaysia), while others appear to have in effect a state religion, though it is not officially sanctioned.
the differences in the regression 2.3 and 2.4 results as intrinsic differences in the specification of the dependent variables. See the appendix for lists of the country samples.)
Studentized residuals were generated for all observations. Guyana was the only outlier in table 2 with studentized residuals exceeding 2.0 in absolute value in all cases. Among the predominately Muslim countries, there was no pattern to the studentized residuals. There were occasional outliers (e.g., Jordan's values exceeded 2.0 in regressions 2.1 and 2.3; Iran's was less than -2.0 in regression 2.3), but there was no consistent pattern of positive or negative residuals, and most countries lay near the regression line.
As a final step, the religion and cultural variables were combined with the economic fundamentals. Each of the cultural and religiosity variables was added in turn to the regression 2.3 and 2.4 specifications, yielding 18 regressions. Again, in no case were the cultural variables statistically significant.
Long-Term Results
Typically, the national religious affiliation data change slowly as a function of differential birth rates among different groups, in-and out-migration, and conversion, with some notable exceptions: in South Korea, for example, the Christian share rose from less than 1 percent in 1900 to 18 percent in 1970 and 40 percent in 1990. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, Christianity and
Islam have made steady in-roads, eroding the ethno-religious share for centuries. In the regressions reported thus far, the sample period was determined by the availability of data. In the case of the TFP regressions, this was determined by the existence of estimates for a considerable sample of countries for 1973-84. For per capita income growth, the sample period 1970-90 was essentially chosen as the optimal trade-off between maximizing the sample period and maximizing the cross-national sample size, especially for heavily Muslim countries for which the data pre-1970 are sparse. Indeed, one of the basic issues is how something as slowly changing as religious affiliation could explain variable national economic performance.
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The 
IS ISLAM A DRAG ON GROWTH?
Today Muslims are relatively poor, whether the comparison is done to the worldwide mean at either the individual (Bhalla 2002) or national (Kuran 1997) Said (1978) , Kuran (1997) , and Nafissi (1998) for discussion. The basic argument is that Islam preaches fatalism which is inimical to growth; of course, the Koran, like other religious texts is open-ended and subject to interpretation, and as Rodinson (1973) and Kuran (1997) point out there are also verses that encourage enrichment. 43 See Siddiqi (1981) and Kuran (1992) for surveys of Islamic economic institutions and thought. Rodinson (1973) and Kuran (1993 Kuran ( , 2003a argue that in reality, uniquely Islamic economic practices and institutions have minimal impact on resource allocation.
means that whatever the sins of Western imperialists, Islam was developing more slowly than the West during a period of Islamic conquest and geographical expansion into Europe.
There are at least three potential explanations-one emphasizing intellectual roots, one sociological, and one institutional. Regarding the first, what is needed is a theological break similar to the Protestant Reformation, which could alter behavior and provide the turning point between long periods of relatively successful and unsuccessful development. Lewis (1982) argues that somewhere between the 9th and 11th centuries, "the gate of ijtihad" (independent reasoning) was closed-meaning that all answers were already available, hence there was no need for inquiry, just follow and obey. 44 Traditional Muslim education systems taught a finite set of information rather than how to "use their own judgment, exercise their critical faculties, and decide things for themselves" (Lewis, 1993, 354 In an institutional analysis complementary to those of Greif and Lal, Kuran (2002) provides an interpretation of how Islamic practices, for example inheritance rules, inhibited the development of commercial institutions comparable to those developed in the West during the Renaissance, and as a consequence disadvantaged Islamic merchants in competition with their Western counterparts. Indeed, Kuran (2002 Kuran ( , 2003b argues that these institutional constraints explain why commerce within the Middle East came to be increasingly dominated by non-44 Lewis (1993) expands upon this critique of "the authoritarian character of traditional pedagogy" and its emphasis on rote memorization. Of course, authoritarian pedagogy and rote memorization are not unique to the schools of Islamic countries, as any Japanese or Korean schoolchild could attest. Ayubi (1993) accepts Lewis' interpretation of the closing of the gate of ijtihad but argues that it was reopened in the 19 th century by the emergence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciples. See also Lal (1998) for discussion. 45 See Turner (1974) , Metcalf (1999) , and Peters (1999) for discussions of the superficial similarities between the 19 th century Islamic reform movements and the Protestant Reformation.
Muslim religious minorities until the widespread adoption of Western institutions and practices in the 19 th century.
All of these lines of argumentation could be used to rationalize the relative economic underperformance of Islamic societies over long periods. As an empirical matter, it is less clear whether Muslim countries have in fact underperformed relative to similarly situated comparators over the past 50 years or so. Data on per capita income is sketchy, but Barlow's (1982) To investigate this possibility, the Muslim population share of each country was weighted by dividing by the distance between the national capital and Mecca (i.e., the weighted Muslim share declines with distance). 46 In these regressions, the inverse distance weighted Muslim share is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the TFP regression (4.3) and insignificant in the per capita income growth regression (4.4).
Along similar lines what is at issue are characteristics misattributed to Islam that are actually features of Arab culture. 47 Regressions 4.5 and 4.6 report regressions in which the Arab population share is added to the model, and for the sake of completeness, regressions 4.7 and 4.8
report the results with the inverse distance Arab population share. In all four cases, the relevant coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent level or better.
An examination of the residuals revealed that once again Guyana was the only outlier.
Among the predominately Muslim countries, studentized residuals exceeding 2.0 in absolute value were relatively rare: only Indonesia in regression 4.8 (2.01) and Iran in regressions 4.1 (-2.67) and 4.3 (-3.15). These results provide no support for the notion that Islam is a drag on growth-if anything, the results in table 4 reinforce the notion that the impact of Islam is positive.
ANALYSIS ON SUBNATIONAL DATA
The cross-national results reported thus far are suggestive but are subject to distortion arising from the inability to adequately control for country-specific economic, political, and institutional influences. Many economic phenomena that vary across countries such as differences in inflation rates, trade policies, or judicial practices can be ignored when examining developments within a single country using data on subnational jurisdictions. So the analysis is extended to the singlecountry level using data from three multi-ethnic societies with substantial Muslim populationsIndia, Malaysia, and Ghana-with the aim of providing a check on the cross-national results. The countries were selected on the basis of the availability of subnational data and the existence of significant Muslim and non-Muslim populations.
India
India has the world's third largest Muslim population, following Indonesia and Pakistan. The geographic dispersion of this population across 32 Indian states and union territories is shown in figure 1 . Table 5 reports regressions of economic and religious affiliation variables on state-level data. In regression 5.1, the dependent variable is TFP growth derived from Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999) . That source reports TFP estimates for 17 "heavily agricultural" states. 48 The growth rates of TFP were calculated for 1973-83 and 1983-93 and the observations stacked, with a dummy for the first sample period included to allow the intercept to vary. 49 The regressions 
Malaysia
The population of Malaysia consists largely of three ethnic groups: indigenous Malays or bumiputra, Chinese, and Indians, and there is a high correlation between ethnicity and religious 48 The TFP data is available for Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Data on explanatory variables are missing for Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, yielding 15 usable cross-sectional observations and a panel of 30 observations. 49 A number of sample observations were lost due to missing data for some of the variables. 50 The female literacy rate fit the data better than did the male literacy rate or the overall literacy rate. Since according to Schultz (1995) there are reasons to believe that female literacy has an especially positive impact on development, the regressions with female literacy are reported. 51 Future work will also utilize state-level data on caste and so-called scheduled tribes. 52 The Indian census reports data for 30 states. In regression 5.2, per capita income growth is missing for Lakshadweep, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli. Religious affiliation data is missing for Assam. 53 The coefficient on the Jain share in particular is quite large-a one percentage point increase in the Jain share of the population would be associated with a 1.49 percentage point increase in the real per capita growth rate. Since Jains only make up 0.5 percent of the population this is probably the wrong increment to consider. Suppose, however, that the Jain population were to double as a percentage of India's population. The results reported in regression 5.2 indicate that this would generate a 0.75 percentage point increase in the per capita growth rate. Perhaps they are the model minority.
affiliation (table 6) . Islam is the official state religion, though the freedom to practice other religions is guaranteed under the constitution. 54 The distribution of Muslims across 13 Malaysian states and two federal territories is shown in figure 2. figure 3 . Anthropological studies summarized in Last (1979) and Kennedy (1988) indicate that conversion to the Abrahamic faiths has sometimes been associated with behavioral changes such as greater entrepreneurship and the establishment of modern business enterprises.
Data on per capita income levels for Ghana's ten regions were constructed from household surveys conducted in 1988, 1992, and 1998. 56 In addition to income, these surveys were used to construct data at the regional level on such attributes as years of schooling, ethnicity, religious affiliation, population density, time spent fetching water and wood, and distance to water source. Monthly data on average and extreme temperatures and precipitation are also available at the regional level through the Ghana Meteorological Services Department. Given environmental differences between coastal southern Ghana and the northern savannah, data on regional capital latitude were collected, and a landlocked regional dummy was constructed. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the relationship between religion, culture, and economic performance.
The theoretical literature is indeterminate. Empirically, accepting the problematic nature of national culture as a concept, statistically at least, there are correlations between religious affiliation, the intensity of religious belief, and indicators of cultural tendencies. However, the national cultural measures have no explanatory power with respect to national economic performance once conventional economic fundamentals are taken into account.
In contrast, in both cross-country and within-country regressions, the null hypothesis that religious affiliation is uncorrelated with performance can frequently be rejected, though the regressions do not yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religions.
Some commentators have claimed that Islam is inimical to growth. In general this is not borne out by the econometric analysis either at the cross-country or within-country level.
57 As in the cross-national case, this result is obtained even if simultaneous equation estimators are used to control for any possible negative impact of Islam on female educational attainment.
DATA APPENDIX
The Schooling Quality" dataset available on the World Bank's website. As noted in the text, the crosscountry TFP estimates were originally constructed by Collins and Bosworth (1996) but are actually published in Rodrik (1999) .
The data for the power, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation variables have been obtained from Hofstede (2001) . Data on achievement was taken from McClelland (1961) . Church attendance, belief in god, and religious upbringing data were taken from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) . Data on political institutions were found in the Long-run cross-country data on per capita GDP were taken from Maddison (2001) .
Population and religion data for 1900 were taken from the World Christian Encyclopedia 2 nd edition (Barret, Kurian, and Johnson, eds.). Urbanization data for 1900 were calculated from Chandler and Fox (1974) .
Indian data on per capita GDP, population density, female literacy rates, and religion were taken from the Statistical Abstract of India (various years). Data on state TFP levels, village electrification, road density, and development expenditures were obtained from "Government Spending, Growth and Poverty, " Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1998) . The authors also kindly provided the data on annual rainfall.
Malaysian data on state per capita GDP, population density, religion and ethnicity for 2000 were acquired from the "Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics"
produced by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Other data concerning per capita GDP, school enrollment, juvenile delinquents, population density, and ethnicity were taken from the "General Report on the Population Census" (various years), also produced by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
As described in the text, the data for Ghana are derived from the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, with the exception of the meteorological data that were obtained from the Ghana Meteorological Services Department.
Figure 1 Religious affiliation in India, 1971
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